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) 
[L.A. No. 20183. In Bank. Feb. 28. 1949.] 
JACK GORDON, R.e.<;pondent, v. AZTEC BREWING 
COMPANY (a Corporation),. Appellant. 
[IJ Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Bursting of Bottle.-Wbere 
a bottle containing liquid under pressure explodes causing 
injury, the person injured is entitled to the benefit of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference that the 
bottler was negligt'nt, either in excessively charging the 
liquid or in fniling to discover a flaw in the bottle, if it is 
probable under the evidence that· it was negligent in either 
respect. 
[2] Id.-lnstructionB-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-In a purchaser's action 
against a bottling conlpany for personal injuries sustained 
when a bottle of beverage exploded, an instruction on res 
ipsa loquitur was warranted where the evidence tended to 
show that defendant was negligent in failing to make any of 
the standard tests for the detection of flaws in the bottlea 
it distributed. 
[3J Id.- Rea Ipsa Loquitur - Control of IJistrumentality.- The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied only where the 
instrumentality causing the injury was subject to the control 
of the defendant. 
[4] Id.-Bes Ipsa Loquitur-Bursting of Bottle.-In a purchaser's 
action against a bottling company for personal injuries sus-
tained when a bottle of beverage explod2d, while evidence 
that the case containing the bottle suffered no damage at any 
stage of its transportation from defendant's plant, that it was 
[3] See 19 Cal.Jut. 708 i 38 Am.Jur. 989. 
McK. Dig. Rcferenccs: [1,4] Necligence, § 138(3); [2,5] Negli-
g'·W·t·, § 1!)8(2); [3] Nl!gligl!nce, § 136; [6J Appehl and Error, 
§ 1Ij:10; (7,81 N('glig'!'ll\'e, § 249(5); [9] Corporations, ~ 5; (10] 
Corpul'utions, ~ Ii; lH, 12J Corporlltions, § 8. 
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ship, and that the business continued as before, .. with the 
partners being the same persons all the stockholders in the 
corporation, it was proper to instruct that the corporation 
WI1S the alfer ego of the partnership, and that if one was liable, 
both were tiable. 
[10] ld.- Disregard of Oorporate };ntit~ - When Proper.- Tho 
courts will refuse to recognize the fiction of separate corporAte 
e:ristenee where to do 80 would foster an injustice or further 
a fraud. 
[11] Id.-Disregard of Oorporate Entit7-Pleading.-In a pur-
chnll8r'1I action against a bottling corporation for perlion:ll 
injunell sustained when a bottlc of bevernge exploded, wher" 
dc:£endant denied that it WA.'1 engaged in the bUliine~ of 
bottling, seIJing and distributing the beverllge at any time 
mentioned in the complaint, but maintained that a partuer..hip 
of the sa.m.e name had done so, the question of which entity 
manufactured the beverage and was responsible for the safety 
of its contaiuers, was thereby auftl.cientl~ raised. 
[12J ld.-Disregard of Oorporate Entit~-Pler.diDg.-In a pur-
chaser'1I action against a· bottling corporation, even it the 
pleadings were deficient in rwing the issue that the corpora-
tion was the aller ,go of a partnership of the same name, 
defendant was not misled to ita prejudice by any varil1nce 
between the pIlladings and the proof where it maint:tined 
throughout the trinl that the liabilities of the partDer~hip 
eonld not be fastened on the corporation. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained when a 
bottle of beverage exploded. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
I 
Eugene S. Ives and Schell & Delamer for Appellant. 
Mitchell" Gold, Samuel A. Rosenthal and Leonard G. 
Ratner for Respondent. 
SHENK, J .-This is an aetion arising out of injuries suf-
fered when a bottle of beer exploded. 
The plaintiil operated a caf6 in the city of Los Angeles. 
He was transferring a bottle of ABC beer, a product of the 
defendant, from its case to an icebox in his cafe when the 
bottle exploded in his hand, resulting in blindness in hi" 
right eye. The defendant was the bottler. From a judgment 
on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff the defendant appeals. 
The first question to be determined is whether on the facts 
prCl:lentt.>Ci the plaintiff was entitled to an instruction on the 
I 
I 
r 
'. 
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~ [33 C.JcI sa; 203 P.2d 522] i ~octrine of r~ iplia loquitur; and if -so-'-~h-c-t.h-e-r-th-e par-
t, tieular instruction given by the trial court was prejudicially 
. ,In E,eola v. Ooca Cola Bottling Oo~1. 24 Ca1.2d 453 [150 
436], it was pointed out that a sound bottle of carbonated 
does not ordinarily explode if it is cRrefully handled. 
Where a bottle containing liquid under pressure docs 
I.Jxploae causing injury the plaintiff is entitled to the bt'Qcllt 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference 
the bottler Willi negligent, either in excesI!ive1y charging 
liquid or in failing to discover a fiaw' in the bottle, if it 
probable under the evidence that the defendant was negli-
in either respect. 
Here there was evidence tending to show the defendant 
•. Ji:egligl~nt in failing to make any of the standard test.<; for the 
E:iil~tiectiion of flaws in the bottles it distributed. New and u~d 
were subjected only to a pasteurization process delligned 
"'ii"'ln,,~.,I.., to arrest fermentation, not' to reveal weakne~l~l. 
expert having long experience in the manufacture of glns.o; 
glass bottles testified that the pasteurization proce.~ wa.'I 
. a satisfactory teHt for strains, thin walls or small stonflll 
glass. He stated that manufacturers ordinarily sub.iect 
.·JIJIIJlol>J.t:III to three tests, the polariscope test, the hammer test, 
the hot and cold plunge test. Thl'se tests if properly made 
. said to disclose all defects. None was utilized by the 
There was no showing that their use would have 
impracticable or the cost prohibitive. The defendant'!' 
to make sueb tests is emphasized by the fact that bottle.<; of 
were known to explode during pasteurization and 
°'-fl:ar,W8.l'd during transportation. A sufficiently satisfactory 
of probable negligence on the part of the defendant 
therefore made to warrant an instruction on res ipsa 
~uiitnr. 
The doctrine may be applied, however, only where the 
~rwtDel!ltali causing the injury was subject to the control 
defendant. In the Escola case this court rejected the 
~~]llte]ltiClln that the instrumentality must have been in the 
po8BeS1!Jion of the defendant at the time of the accident. It 
. there stated: "Many authorities state that the happening 
. accident does not speak for itself where it took place 
. time after defendant had relinquished control of the 
Mllm4entalit;y causing the injury. Under the more logical 
however, ,the doctrine may be applied upon the theory 
defeJidant had control at the time of the alleged neglig:ent 
) 
GI8 GoRDON v. AZTEC BREWING CO. l33 C.2d 
/1"t. nltnongh nIlt at th~ time of fbI' n,.,.idf'nt, prmi;"-r,:l plainHI1' 
lir~t Pl"VW that fh~ '!('ll(lition of ' the instrumentality had Ilut 
[,1'/011 dl1l1lgt'd nrtl'r it left the def('ndant's possession," While 
the Escola ca:;;c differs from the present case in that tJlere the 
dcf~·ndant bottler had itself ddiv(~rcd the faulty buttle to 
the plaintiff's employer the principll's laid down govern the 
CR!':E' here. It was then declarcd thnt a plaintiff ~ay rely on 
the doctrine of res ipRa loquitur "if there i~ ('vidence p,.r-
mitting a reasonable inference that it [the explodt·d bottle] 
was not accessible to extraneous harmful forces and that it 
was carefully handled by plaintiff or any third person who may 
have moved or touched it." (Racola v. Ooca Oola Bottling Co., 
supra, 24 Cal.2d 453,458.) 
[4] Tracing the case containing the bottle which exploded 
from the defendant's plant to his hand the plainti1f intro-
duced evidence to the e1fect that it su1fered no. damage at 
any stage of its transportation. The course of cases of ABO 
beer in August of 1944 when the accident occurred was as 
follows: The cases were loaded on trucks of the La Salle 
Trucking Company at the defendant's San Diego plant; La 
Salle drivers delivered them to a warehouse of the Associated 
Brewers Distributing Company in Los Angeles where they 
remained about three days; on August 22 the case which 
contained the bottle that exploded was delivered by an 
Associated driver to the plaintiff. Evidence was presented 
which showed that La Salle trucks were not involved in 
accidents during August, 1944; that no accidents occurred in 
the Associated warehouse that month which might have 
affected the beer; that the driver who delivered the case to 
the plainti1f was not involved in an accident en route and did 
not bump the case; that it was in excellent condition Dn_ ... _____ ... 
delivery, and that the plainti1f handled the case and bottle 
carefully. While this evidence was not conclusive it was the 
jury's province to determine, after being properly inStructed, 
whether the plainti1f had sutHciently proved the abscnce 
of intervening harmful forces after the defendant shipped 
the bottle to entitle the plainti1f to rely on an inference 
inherent in the doctrine that the defendant'8 lack of care 
was the proximate cause of his injury. 
[5] But it is contended by the defendant that even if 
it be assumed that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was cor-
rectly invoked the court committed prejudical error in an 
instruction on the subject. The following instnlction is 
claimed to be erroneous and to require a reversal: "From 
) 
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. . the happening of the accident involved in this case, as 
established by the evidence, there arises an,. inference that 
the proximate cause of the occurrence was some negligent 
eonduct on the part of the defendant. That inference i~ a 
lorm of evidence, and if there is none other tending to over-
it, or if the inference preponderates over contrary evi-
it warrants a verdict for the plaintiff. Therefore you 
weigh any evidence tending to overcomo that inference. 
1l!1'wl:rin.tl in mind that it is incumbent upon the defend:mt to 
&'. ____ •• the inference by showing that it did, in fact, exercise 
care and diligence or that the accident occurred 
........ to:nnTIT. being proximately caused by any failure of duty on 
part." Standing alone this instruction was erroneous for 
omitted reference to the fact that before the jury may 
............. ~-" the plaintiff the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur inferencE' 
believe that the bottle did not suffer damage at the 
.~ ... _,_' of persons other than the defendant. 
In determining the propriety of an instruction the 
mrielVin.$t court should examine the charge as a' whole. (W el13 
21 CaUd 452, 458 [132 P.2d 471] ; Douglas v. South-
By. Co., 203 Cal. 390, 396 [264 P. 237].) If when 
I~Dnside:red together the instructions are found generally to 
. the applicable law. reversible error is not necessarily 
even though an isolated instruction is defective in 
. 'containing all of the essential elements. (Westover v. City 
Angeles, 20 Cal.2d 635, 637 [128 P.2d 350] ; CaUet v. 
210 Cal. 65, 70 [290 P. 438J.) 
. After the above instruction was given, the court went 
" charge: "The instruction just given may appear to 
I18tiitn1te an exceptiop to the general rule that the mere 
pp'enlng of an accident does not support an inference of 
The instruction, however, is based on a special 
of the law which may be applied only under special 
i'PM,m .. tAn,t .... , they being as follows: FirSt: the fact that some 
lBtl:'UDlien1:ality. by which the injury to the plaintiff was 
caused, was in the possession and under the 
DltcllllSi've control of the defendant at the time the cause of the 
1J''i1,.;.,,_ was set in motion. . . . A defendant is deemed to 
. control at the time of the alleged negligent act although 
at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first proves 
. the condition of the instrnmentality had not been changed 
. it left the defendant's possession. The defendant is not 
with the duty of showing that something happened 
. bottle after it left its control and management. III 
) 
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order to be entitled to the bellefit of LiJt! doctrine of relS ip~a 
loquitur, the plaintiif must show that every person who moved 
or touched the bottle after it left the control of the deff>nc1nnt. 
did 80 with due care, and that during said time tht' botth' wus 
not accessible to extraneous harmful forces." 
Thus the broad instruction on res ipsa loquitur was follow,·.1 
by qualifying instructions explaining the circumstanc(·s whi,·I. 
must be present before the inference of negligence NLn IIri" .. . 
including a charge that the plaintiif must prove that all wi .. . 
dealt with the bottle beside the defendant did 80 with du(> carl'. 
It is therefore apparent that taken together the entire char;!t· 
on the subject fairly presented to the jury the element "r' 
careful handling and that the erroneous omission of tlllll 
element from the general instruction was not prejudicial. 
(See Westover v. Oity of Lo. Angele., supra, 20 Cal.2d 635, 
637~39; Jucherl v. Oalifornia Water Service 00., 16 Cal.2d 
500, 513-15 [106 P.2d 886] ; Barham v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206. 
216-18 [291 P. 173] ; McOhristian v. Popkin, 75 CaI.App.2c1 
249, 257-58 [171 P.2d 85] ; Bar.ha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
32 Cal.App.2d 556, 565 [90 P.2d 371].) 
[8] For still another reason the defendant's attempt hi 
show reversible error must fail. Apart from instructionl! CIt I 
res ipsa loquitur, instructions on general ru1es governin,.: 
liability for negligence were given. The jury was instructt't1 
that the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove by a prl" 
ponderance of evidence that the defendant was riegligent al111 
that his negligence was a proximate cause of the injury. Therl' 
was present in this case a strong showing of negligence in 
the defendant's failure to test the bottles before distributin!! 
them to the public where they might cause harm if defective. 
There was also evidence to refute the possibility of intervenin:,! 
damage to the bottle. Under these circumstances the instruc-
tion on res ipsa loquitur, even if erroneous, did not result in 
a miscarriage of justice, for it is highly improbable that the 
jury found in the plaintiif's favor without concluding that 
the defendant was negligent and that the bottle was carefuU:,' 
handled after the defendant parted with it. (Gerdes v. Pa-
cific Gas ct Electric 00., 219 Cal. 459, 471 [27 P.2d 365, 90 
A.L.R. 1071] ; Junge v. Midland Oounties etc. Corp., 38 Cal. 
App.2d 154, 160 [100 P.2d 1073]; Gonzalez v. Nichols, 110 
Cal.App. 738, 741-42 (294 P. 7581.) 
This action was prosecuted against the defendant corpora-
tion only and it is contended that any cause of action for 
injuries resu1ting from defects in ABC beer bottles, which 
) 
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the date of plaintiff 's i~j\lry should have been brought 
.'g&lI1S1 the Aztec Brewing Company, a partnership, and not 
Brewing Company, a corporation. It appears that the 
did not ll'arn the details of the defendant's structure 
. its relationship to the partnership until the action against 
Y,CJ""uucun corporation had proceeded to trial. When thes(! 
.• were disclosed the plaintiff decided to proceed against 
1f(,(lL(U'~lnIAIJU, corporation instead of the partnership on the 
that one was the alter ego of the other. 
is no conflict in the evidence on this question. The 
. ;Brewing Company, a corporation, wa., organized in 
, and thereafter engaged in tho manufacture and sale of 
. beer. In March, 1944, the company's structure was 
to a partnership for tax reasons. All of the corpora· 
"property was transferred to the partnership and the 
continued as before, the partnership assuming with· 
the manufacturing, bottling and selling of 
beer. The partners were the same persons as the stock· 
in the corporation. They acquired and retained the 
'proportional interest in the partnership as they had had 
, corporate stock. The president and viee.president of 
~:i!rOl']pol~atiion became general partners in the new partner· 
the other former stockholders became' limited 
The name, Aztec Brewing Company, was retained 
license procured to sell beer under that name. The part. 
. continued to employ the same personnel and use the 
.. jnanufacturing plant and offices. No changes were 
. in: labels, packing cases, letterheads or invoices. ., The 
ft\1otj!'~tio'n was not dissolved, however, but remained in 
to collect debts owed it, continuing for a short time 
offices of its successor. Checks of the corporation 
. were differentiated by the addition of the 
. corporation" or " a partnership" after the name, 
'Brewing Company. 
On the basis of these facts the trial court instrnctcd 
. celt has been established in this case that A1.tec 
Company, a corporation, is the 'alter ego or other 
the Aztec Brewing Company, a copartnership. There· 
fl one is liable, both are liable." A verdict in the 
IintnP".·, favor was returned against the corporation lind 
Ll'tiIl'ershin and' a judgment entered against both. 
defendant contends that the relationship of altef' ego 
. established 8S a matter of law and that the in.~rU.:tioJl 
eifectwBS improper. A similar case was decided by 
) 
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the Supreme Court of: the State ot' Washington in Associated 
Oil Co. v. Seiberling Rubber Co., 172 Wash. 204 r19 P.2d 940]. 
Suit was brought. against the Seiberling Rubber Company, 
an Ohio corporation, to recover on a guaranty alleged to have 
been executed by the defendant. In the written guaranty, 
the guarantor was described as Seiberling Rubber Company, 
a D~Iaware corporation, and the guaranty was signed "Seiber-
ling Rubber Company. tt After the answer was filed the 
plaintiff discovered for the first time that there were two 
corporationl'l closely allied, the de!cnd:mtOhio corporation, 
ann It Delaware corporat.ion havin~ the snme name. It wac; 
found that the Delaware corporation owned all the stock of 
the Ohio corporation, that their officers were identical, and 
that the business affairs of the two corporations were conducted 
from the same offices. Because of the similarity in names and 
commingling of business the Washington Supreme Court held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to t.reat the two corporations as 
a sin~lc ('ntity, and thus recover from the defendant, although 
it bad not signed the note, since the confusion of the two 
identities resulted in probable fraud upon third persons deal-
ing with the corporations, whether or not actual fraud was 
intended. Related also to this case is our d"cision in Marabito 
v. San Franc1.3co Dairy Co., 1 Ca1.2d 400 [35 P.2d 513], in 
which a truck bearing the name of the defendant San Fran-
cisco Dairy Company struck the plaintiff. It was urged that 
the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict against the 
deff'ndant since it was merely a nonoperating subsidiary of 
the Dairy Delivery Company which carried on the business. 
The officers of both companies were the same. This court held 
ibatthe only logical conclusion was that the San Francisco 
Dairy Company was1the alter ego of the Dairy Delivery Com-
pany and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict 
against the San Francisco Dairy Company. Subsequently an 
order adding to the judgment the name of the Dairy Delivery 
Company as the real defendant was sustained. (Marabito v. 
San Francisco Dairy Co., 8 Cal.App.2d 54 [47 P.2d 5301.) 
That these decisions involve two corporations and not a 
corporation and partnership as in the case before us does 
not lessen their significance for the same principles apply. 
[10] The cases mentioned illustrate in a factual context 
similar to that before us the rule that where the recognition 
of the fiction of separate corporate existence would foster an 
injustice or further a fraud the courts will refuse to recognize 
it. (8tark v. Coker, 20 Ca1.2d 839,846 [129 P.2d 390j ; Puccetft 
) 
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v. Girola,20 CaJ.2d 574,578 [128 P .. 2d 13J; Shea v. Leonis, 
14 Cal.2d 666, 669 [96 P.2d 332J.) It is not necessary that 
the plaintiff prove actual fraud. It is enough if'the recognition 
of the two entities as separate woul<l result in an injustice. 
(Wellban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 698 [227 P. 
7231; Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 488 [202 P. 673].) 
[9b] Here confusion would be promoted and an unjust result 
be accomplished if the maintenance of the two entities con-
trolled by the same persons and having an identical name were 
permitted to frustrate a meritorious claim. Since thE' evidence 
on this qnestion was not contradi('ted th('rc was no issne of 
fact requiring submission to the jury and the trial court's de-
termination that as a matter of law.the corporate defendant 
was the alter ego of the partnership must be sustained. 
[11] It is contended by the defendant that the issue of 
whether there existed an alter ego relationship was not pleadcd 
Hnd was therefore not before the trial court. Defects in the 
complaint may be cured by allegations of the answer. (Vaughn 
v. Jonas, 31 Cal.2d 586. 603-04 [191 P.2d 4321; Hariman 
Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 248-49 [73 
P.2d 11631; 1I1arr v. Postal Union Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal.App. 
2d 673,680-81 [105 P.2d 649].) In its answer the defendant 
denied that it was engaged in the business of bottling, selling 
and distributing ABC beer at any time mentioned in the com-
plaint. The question of which entity manufactured the becr 
and was responsible for the safety of its containers, was 
!, thereby sufficiently raised. [12] Furthermore, even if the 
pleadings were to be considered deficient in tbis respect, it is 
t' clear tbat the defendant ;has not heen,misled to its prejudice 
1. by any variance between pleadings and proot (Code Civ. 
r: Proc., § 469.) From the beginning of the proceedings it WitS 
:- prepared to maintain, and did maintain throughout the trial, 
i. tbnt the liabilities of the partnership could not be tnstened 
f' upon the corporation. , 
~ The judgment is affirmed. 
r:c 
:." 
i" Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer J and Spence .J , ., , ., 
~ concurred. 
k . TRAYNOR, J.-I conC'ur in the judgment. 
~, It is my opinion that the evidence in this case does not 
twarrant the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
k~nd that if defendant's liability is predicated on negligence 
i;ri;, 
'\ 
~'. 
i 
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the instructions on res ipsa loquitur l are prejudicially erro-
neous even though there is evidence that would support the 
verdict independently of that doctrine. 
The luajority opinion jUlitifics these instructions on the 
gruunds that there W8lJ evidence of negligence on the part 
of ddendant and enough evidence to warrant an infcr('nce 
tln,t there was no change in the condition of the bottll' art('r , 
lThe jUl'1 wu iDatrueted u followl: . 
• • From the happeniug of the accident involvod in tbil case, BII eatab· 
lishod b,. the evidence, there arilel au inference that the pronmate enuso 
of tbe occurrence waa lOIIIe negligent conduct on the part of dcfond:l1lt. 
That inference is a form of evidence, and if there is none otber tending 
to overthrow it, or if the inferenue. preponderatea over contral'1 evidence, 
it wal'l'lUlts a verdict for the plnintiif. Theretore, you should weigh lUI,. 
evidence tending to overeome that inference, belLriug in mind thnt it iI 
incumbent upon the detendant to rebut the intereneo by sho,dng that it 
did, in fact, exercise ordinar;y care and diligence or tllat tbe nCC!idC'nt 
oc:currod with"ut being proximatel,. Mused by an,. iniluro o~ dllty on lts-
pnrL . 
• • In mn.king such a showing, it ill not n"OOStIal'1 for a dct,'ud:1nt to 
overcome the inference b;y a prcponder:mce of the evidenco. Phintiff'l 
burden of proving negligence b,. n preponderance ot the evideneo ill not· 
ch:mgcd by the mle just mentioned. It follows, thurefore, tbn.t in oMI'r 
to hold the dufl'ndA.nt Ii:\ble, the inference of negligence lJl1¥lt hRvo grt'lltC'r 
wdght, more convincing force in thfl mind of the jul'1. than the OPPOIIing 
cxpJ:Ul:\tion oifered by the defendant. 
.. If .lIuch a preponderance in plaintilf's favor enats, then it must be 
found that some negligent conduct on the po l't of defendant WIUI a pruxi· 
m:lte c:\use ot the injur;y; but if it dOel not exist, if the evidence prepon· 
del:\te!I in defendant's favor, or if in the jul'1'S mind there il an even 
b:t1:meo u between the weight of the biterence and the weight of the 
r.olltrnl'1 explanation, neither having the more collvincing foree, then the 
vf)r(lict must be for the defendant • 
•• The instruction just given may appear to cunstitute an exception to 
the general rule that the mere happening of an accident does not support 
.. , ... -.---.------ -iln 4nttlrenee of negligence. The Inltruction, however, iI baaed on a spe-
cial doctrine of the law whie" rna,. be applied onl;y UDder Ipecial cireum· 
lItancCl, the;y being as follows: 
"First: The fact that some certain instrumentalit;y, by which injUl'1 
to the plaiuti1! was proximately caused, wu in the poneasion and under 
the .. xelusive control of the deteDdnnt at the time the caun of injur;y 
was RUt in motion, it appenring on the tace of the event that the injUl'1 
wns cauaed b;y Rome act or omission incident to defendant'l management. 
•• Second: The fact thllt the accident was one of such nature u dose 
not bappen in the ordin:\r;y course of things, if those who have control 
ot the bl"trumcnt:llity use ordinal'1 c,'lre. •.• 
.. A defendant. is deemed to have had control ot an iDatrumenmlity 
where it hnd eontrol at the time of the alleged negligent act although 
not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiif first provCl that the 
condition ot the instrumentalit;y had not been changed after it left de-
fenitant's ponession. . 
•• The detendant is not charged With the dut,. of showing that some-
thing happened to the bottle after it left ita control and management. In 
order to be entitled to the benefit of the doctrine ot rei ipsa loquitur, the 
pL'lintiif must show that evel'1 person who moved or touched the bottle 
nft,-r it left tlle control of detendant. did so with due care, and thnt duro 
iA, Aid time the bottle W:l1I not accenible to utraneoUi harmful tore .. JJ 
) 
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defendant relinquished control of it. In my opinion tbe in-
structions cannot be justified on either ground. 
In support of the first ground the majority opinion adduces 
the evidence that defendant did not apply the standarci teRlIt 
U1ted by bottle manufacturers to aseertain if bottles are free 
of defects, together with the evidence that bottles frequently 
broke at the brewery and during' their· transportation there-
after. The majority opinion thus invokes evidence of defend-
ant's conduct and the quality of his bottles to justify an 
instruction that negligence may be inferred, not from such 
evidence, but from the occurrence of the accident itself. The 
npplication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur depends, how-
ever, on the nature of the accident and on whether defendant 
had exclusive control of the bottle at the time the cause of 
injury was set in motion. Evidence regarding defendant's 
bottling procedure is immaterial since the inferences are to 
be drawn solely from the occurrence of the accident and de-
fendant'scontrol; if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not 
already applicable such evidence does not render it so. 
In support of the contention that the bottle was carefully 
handled and was not accessible to any extraneous harmful 
forces after leaving the brewery, plaintiff introduced evi-
denee that the truck that carried the beer to Los Angeles had 
not been in any accident, that the manager of the company 
that distributed the beer did not know of any accident in the 
distributing company '. warehouse, that the truck that deliv-
ered the beer to plaintiff pad not been in any accident, that 
,the man who delivered the beer to plaintiff handled the 
bottles carefully and observed that -the eases appeared to be 
1tt excellent condition, and that the beer was handled carefully 
by plaintiff. The manager of the distributing company called 
is a witness for plaintiff, testified as follows: 
-~r"Q. During the time ... [that the bottle was in the ware-
house] were you aware of any accident occurring at your 
warehouse that affected these bottles of beer in any way' 
';a\;; None whatsoever. 
:{ "Q. If there is any accident in your warehouse or in ' 
tour plant which would cause breakage of bottles does that 
'fac~o the men in your employ, do they bring this infor-
'lbntion to you! A. Well, they don't, not necessarily, because 
in handling bottled goods, merchandise, like beer, if it is not 
handled properly it would cause breakage; in other words, 
if our men taking the beer oft the atacka, oft the conveyors, 
I~.'-··.··.···' . ,. '<-;"". 
" 
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and putting it in stacks, when they have to go up sp.""n high 
nr l'Iix high, in just loading it on there, they Ilsed too much 
force, the force inside would cause two bottles to bump against 
each other and the chances are a bottle would break. 
c, Q. All right, now then, when there is such breakage 
oceurring do your men make reports of this breakage to you' 
A. No, not necessarily. 
ceQ. What happens when this breakage occurs; do you just 
simply stack that ease aside' A. No, we put that case aside. 
cc Q. And do you salvage itt A. We salvage the goods or 
put in another bottle. If it is just one bottle we just take out 
the glass and put another full bottle in. 
ceQ. During •.. [the time that the bottle was in the ware-
house] Jidyou personally have any knowledge as to whether 
some of the cases had any broken bottles of beer in them, 
that is, the ABC cases' A. There ian't any time that 
there isn't a bottle or two broken to the (!fiRe. Therc is always 
soml'thing broken on account of handling of it. 
ccQ. You mean handling it at your warehouse' A. Our 
warehouse, or handling it at the loading of the truck at the 
brewcry, or it can happen anywhere." 
The foregoing evidence regarding the ha.ndling of the bottle 
arter it left defendant's brewery, fails to prove that the bottll' 
W8.<S not subject to extraneou.'5 harmful forces; in fact it 
proves just the contrary. There iR no indication that the han-
dling that broke mauy bott.les fcc There isn't any time that 
therc ian't a bottle or two broken to the case. There is always 
something broken on account of handling of it. "] didnot also 
weaken others enough to mak~ them dangerons. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is based on probabilities. 
The nature of the injury together with defendant's control 
must be such that reasonable men can conclude it is more 
probable than not that the cause of the injury was negligent 
conduct on the part of defendant. (La Porte v. Houston, 
ante, pp. 167, 169 [199 P.2d 665] ; Honea v. Oity Dairy, Inc., 
22 Cal.2d 614, 616-617 [140 P.2d 369] : Binds 'V. Wkeadon, 
19 Cal.2d 458, 461 [121 P.2d 724] ; see Prosser, Torts, p. 297.) 
Reasoning solely from the occurrence of the accident and the 
evidence of what happened to the bottle after it left defend-
ant's control, one cannot conclude it is more probable than 
not that the bottle broke because of defendant's negligence. 
for it is at least as probable that the bottle broke because of 
handling by the distributor as that it broke because of some 
) 
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The evidence that defendant did not test its bottles and 
that lUany broke or exploded at the brewery aud during their 
tran;o:portation thereafter iii !'Iufficient to warrllUt n finding t.hat 
Jefcndant was n\."gligently relca.o:ing dangerous and defeetiYe 
bottJc~ on the market. The jury eould reasonably conclude, 
therefore, t.hat plaintiff'R injury was caused by defendant '!II 
negligence in releasing such bottles. NevertheleSR, the fact 
that there is some support for the verdict in the evidenct' 
2The error of giving iJ18tructionl on l'eII ipsa loquitur Wall aggravnted 
II), the language of the iDatruCtiODl as is noted by the opinion of Presiding 
.JDltice Shinn for the Distriet Court of Appeal, Second District, Divillion 
Three, which reversed the judgment in this cue. •• By this instruction 
the court withdrew from the jury two essential questions of fact, namely, 
whether plaintiff hnd estnblillhed by his evidence that the bottle WIlS 
probably not rendered unsnfo while it was in the hRnds of other persons 
after it left possession of tho defend:lnt, and' whether the defective or 
dttngerous condition of the bottle would probably have been discovered 
,by defendant in the exercise of ordinary care •..• 
II The first sentence of the questioned iDltruction [quoted in note I, 
""ra] can be interpreted only as a direction to the jury that, as a matter 
of law, under the facts as established by the evidence, the res ipsa loquitur 
inference of negligence was applicable to the defendant; and the suc· 
eOciding two lIentl1nees limited the duty of the jury to weighing thial 
inference agninst any contrary evidence. This instruction would have 
b",cn prol,.,r on:!,. if the mere bursting of the bottle raised an inference 
th:1t 1I0muone had boen negligent, and also if it had been proved by clenr 
udllDcontrl1.dicted evidence thnt the bottle had been carefully handled 
by all 1'IlrBOns who hnd poslIe!lllion of it, and that it WIlS not exposed to 'I: 
injury, nlter it left thE' h:uu\.q of the bottler. The bunting ot the hottle 
did not rnlse un inferenCtl of negligence. However, in view of the IIncon-
. tradicted testimony that the beer bottle was carefully handled by plain- l' 
~tii!, the explosion in it.8elf jUAtified lin inference that, when delivered 
,',to plnintiff, the bottle wascit.her_4Ilfcet,i.!."U~.1"nnder .exeellllive internrul 
·"'pres.cmre, for, na s:dd in ~e Es('ol" ~"'" • lIo'l1nd ttnd properly prepnrcd I ~bottlcs of enrbonated liquids do Dot ordinRrily flxplode when cnl'efully II, 
'handled.' (24 Cnl.2d 453, 4;'9 [laO P.2d 436].) As we baveseen, the 
expert ~timon,. WILl to be weighed with the evidence of the metbods 
'~nnployed by clef<mdant in determining whether the inference aro!le that 
'defendant h:ld been negligent. The instmetion took thil! iS811e from the 
jury ancl W!L8 projudicin1ly erroneous. 
l~" "Moreover, whether this clungerous condition of the bottle develope.l 
""while it WlUI in POlls(''85ion of tho defend:lUt, rnthcr than one of tho int.~r· 
'in ... 1iate parties \"ho hnndlcd it, prc.qcnted a question 01 fact 11.8 to th(l 
.(,manner in whieh it Wall hnndled by these latter nersons. We ('oItnllot say 
... ,tla:lt !he jury eould not have re:tSonably found- that the evidence was 
~i~",~mcient to {lrove that the bottle was carcfully hllndlud, Ilnd waR not 
~ IIl1bJoctcd to tlnmneOlll! harmful forcCII after it left defenruwt '. control. 
~iB7 taking thisnttditional issue of fact from the jur)', tho foregoing in· 
~~1I'tion wns ltg'lin prejnclici:ll to (jefendRnt. 
}~ "PL'1intilr, bowever, r"fers to the estnblished rllie that in .letermining 
.. the {lroprit·ty of instmctions, tlley ml\st be consiilered all a whole (Crool;8 t" 'W1cite. 101 Ca1.App. 304, 312 [290 P. 491]), and maiutttlJllltbnt this 
~:!Utditional error in the qnoted instruction WIlS cured by other inst,ruction!' 
~ which followed it. The record shOWI that the court ltated to the jury 
r 
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independent of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not 
render the erroneous instructions harmless. The effect of add-
ing these instructions to those on the general rules goveminJ! 
liability for negligence is to offer the jury two alternative 
routes'to a verdict for plaintiff. Under general instructions 
on negligence the jury must decide whether plaintiff htls 
discharged his burden of proving that defendant was negli-
gent and if so, whether that negligence was the cause of tho 
injury. Under the res ipsa loquitur instructions the jury 
could conclude that this burden was discharged by an infer-
ence arising from the occurrence of the accident, even if they 
found that plaintiff's evidence of defendant's bottling pro-
cedure fell short of discharging plaintiff's burden of proving 
negligence. They were also presented with a very close ques-
tion as to whether the bottle was defective when defendant 
relinquished control or developed a defect thereafter. Had it 
not been for the res ipsa loquitur instructions it is not im-
probable that they would have concluded that plaintiff had 
tlmtthe inference of negligence referred to in the quoted instruction 
W:l.l! applie4ble only under certain speeial circumstances, one of whi('h 
W38 tlmt tho instruuwntality causing the injury • was in the posse88iun 
nnd undor tho exclusive control of the dcfendnnt a.t the time tho causo 
t)f tho injury was set in motion. I The court then gave the following ill-
structions: • A dcfendnnt is deemed to have control of an instrument:ility 
where it llad control at the time of the alleged negligent Ret although 
not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff first prove thnt tho 
condition of the iDstrumentality had not been changed after it left tho 
dofCUflnnt's p088eBBion. The defendant is not charged with the duty of 
showing that 80mething happoned to the bottlo after it left its control 
and management. In ordttr to be entitled to the bonefit of the doctrine 
of lCII ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must show that every person who moved 
or touchod the bottle after it left tho control of the defendant, did 80 
with due care, and that durin*, said time the bottle was not aeeessiblo 
to extraneous harmful foreos.' It is to bo noted that nowbere in those 
later instructions did the court direct the j1ll7 that it must find tho indi-
cated facts to be true before the supposed inferenco of negligence might 
bo appliod to defendant. Plaintiff's contention that these later instruc-
tions did submit the issue of careful handling to the jury is lUI insuf-
ficient answor, for so construed, they would be in direct confiiet with the 
previous. instruction which, as we have seen, took that issue from tho 
jury. It is well settlod that reversiblo error in the form of erronoous 
instructions cannot be cured by giving other correct instructions, whoro 
the effect is to create a clear eonfiict, and it is imposaible to determine 
'fbich instructions governed the jury's determina.tion. (Wright v. 8ftif-
!en, flO Cal.A.pp.2d 858, 868 [181 P.2d 675]; !lOI. v. Baldwift, '" CAl. 
Al'P.l:!d 433, 486 [112 P.2d 666]; ,flee,.. v. Cowaft, 26 Cal.App.2d 694. 
699 [1110 P.2d 148].) The two sets of instructions m&7 be rceoncilod, 
but only 00 the theory that the court was informing ~e jury thAt. AI 
1\ matter of law, the prerequisite fact of 811bsequcnt e.'U'oful handling 
nftu the bottle left defendant's control. had beon conclusively 88ta.b-
. lisbed. Under this view, the additional error in the original instruction 
WDII clearly not cured by the later instrUctions, but was actually empha-
sized and further impressed upon the minds of the jury." 
I· 
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not discharged his burden of proving that defendant's neg-
ligence was the cause of the' injury. 
Whether the giving of inst.ructions on res ipsa loquitur 
when that doctrine is not 'applicable is pr~judicial, if the 
evidence is sufficient to support the verdict independently 
of the doctrine, depends on the particular facts of the cwre. 
In Gerda v. Pacific Gas ~ Electric Co., 219 Cal. 459 [27 P.2d 
365, 90 A.L.R. 1071], the only issue was whether defendant 
WIlS negligent in not repairing a broken gas line or shutting 
off the gas with sufficient promptness after being informed 
of a cave-in decting its pipes. The court held that the giving 
of a res ipsa loquitur instruction was not prejudicial becau.qe 
it could not "be presumed that the jury may have believed 
that said company was free from negligence in this particular, 
but nevertheless returned a verdict against it, although the 
evidence as a matter of law clearly showed the company to 
be free from negligence in all other respects." (219 Cal. at 
471.) The evidence was clear as to when defendant was noti-
fied of the cave-in, and there Wa.Il no dispute that the injury 
w~ cnllsE'd by an explofdon of gas that escaped from defend-
ant's linc. 
In Gtnazalez v. Nichols, 110 Cal.App. 738 [294 P. 758], 
plaintiiI's autoruobilc collided with defendant's truck parked 
at night in a dip on the traveled part of the highway. The 
rear light of the truck was obscured. There was no dispute 
th:lt the truck's position was a contributing cause of the acci-
dent, and the court held that in view of the exceptionally 
clear case of negligence the instruction on res ipsa loquitur 
did not lead to a miscarriage of justice.··· 
In Junge v. MidlaM Countiu elc. Corp., 38 Cal.App.2d 
154 [100 P.2d 1073], plaintUf was severely burned by contact 
with a fence on which defendant's high tension electric lin~ 
had fallen. The break in the line had caused defendant's 
automatic circuit breaker to open, thus cutting off the powcr 
to the fallen line. Plaintiff was injured because defendant's 
service man had repeatedly reclosed the switch in an attempt 
to restore current through the line. The only issue was 
whether it was negligent to reclose the switch, and there was 
substantial evidence that to do 80 was contrary to the prac-
tice of well-managed power companies. The court held that 
in view of the evidence of negligence the instruction on res 
ipsa loquitur was not prejudicial. 
In none of these cases waR there any queRtion as to what 
conduct on defendant'l:; part caused the injury, and in aU 
) 
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of them there was substantial c\'idellCe thatdefendant',was 
llt'g'Jigent in respect to that conduct. It is unlikely, there-
fore, that in any of them the jury would have found in favor 
of dcfendant on the issue of whether he was negligent in 
respect to such conduct and also found him liable by apply-
ill:! reS ipsa loquitlir, When, as in this case, however, there 
il' doubt as to whether defendant's conduct caused the injury 
or whether it was negligent in any respect, the giving of 
iustructions on res ipsa loquitur when that doctrine does not 
npply is prejudidally erroneous. (Tower v. Hurnbolt Transit 
Co., 17·6 Cal. 602, 607 [169 P. 227] ; Grilsch v. Pic7,wick Staaes 
System, 131 Cal.App. 774, 783-785 [22 P.2d 554] ;,Ot'a'1 v. Los 
.. t,,'geles By. Corp., 69 Cal.App. 123, 125-126 [230 P. 970].) 
By approving the res ipsa loquitur instructions given in 
thi~ case, the majority opinion leaves it to the jury to hold 
dllfclldant strictly liable not only for defects in its bottlt'S 
when they leave its control but also for defects that develop 
in the normal course of marketing procedures. If such lia-
hility is to be impoRtld it lihould be imposed opcnly nnel not 
by SPllriOUS appli('ation of rules developed to dE'termine th(' 
sufik·iency of eirfmmstantial e,idence in n<'{.rligenee eases. 
In J<JscoZa v. Coca Cola Bottling Co .. 24 Ca1.2d 453 [150 
P.2d 436], I concurred in the judgment on the ground that 
a ruanufaeturer incurs an absolute liability when an article 
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be 
used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes 
injury to human beings. I regarded this liability as limited 
to injuries that could be traced to the product as it reached 
the market. There was abundant evidence in the Escola ca.Cle 
that the bottle was def~ctive at the time defendant delivered 
it to the restaurant where plaintiff was employed. In the pres-
ent case the evidence shows that even though the bottle was 
exposed to extraneous harmful forces, it was subjected to no 
more than the usual wear and tear incident to normal mar-
keting procedures and nothing unusual happened to it. Since, 
however, normal handling might have caused the defect, it 
cannot be inferred from the explosion alone that the bottle 
WM defective when defendant relinquished control. It is 
therefore necessary to decide whether the bottler's Rtrict lia-
bility extends not only to defects existing when he relinquishes 
control, but also to defects t.hat arise as a result of normal 
handling therpafter. The facts of t.his ease suggest. that not 
uncommonly a plaintiff will be unable to trace the defect to 
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the botUer lOr 10 fix 11"1,di~.·II .. I· 1111 :lily Hf tI ... fI .. 1'''"", !1':""I.,~h 
whose hands thp hottl.· I'"S~S 1/1'1'",'#' l'(>adlill~ hlll1 
. From the time they are rapped until they arc up('lwcl bot-
are subject to many hazards. They are bounced and 
, bumped, joggled and jostled, as they are loaded, transported, 
Unloaded, refrigerated, and carried from store to home. At 
'any time along this hazardous course a bottle may become 
lI"f' .. "t'lv" and thus a risk to those who handle it. The risk is 
the consumer cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate 
n,."tA,·t himself against. He does not ordinarily inspect 
IFtiiOttles. and in any event it is not likely that he is qualified 
latent defects. He accepts the bottle on faith. The 
exl~lUIUU,ll of bottles is not such a commonplace that those 
(;U,ell1,llllS with them ordinarily guard against that risk. 
The reasons that make the bottler strictly liable for de-
in his bottles when they leave his control extend his 
to defects that result from normal marketing pro-
"Even if there is no negligence . . . public policy 
that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most 
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent 
products that reach the market. It is evident 
the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard 
rfllr&lJnst the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those 
su1fer injury from defective products are unprepared 
Hiii!J'meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss 
or health may be 'an overwhehrling misfortune to the 
HEMIn injured, and a needless one, for the risk of' injury 
be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among 
as a cost of doing business. It is to the public in-
to discourage the marketing of products having defects 
. are a menace to the public. If such products neverthe-
find their way into the market it is to the public interest 
_'ft"D"" the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause 
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in 
maIDU:Ia~ltu:re of the product, is responsible for its reach-
market. However intermittently such injuries may 
and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of 
'occurrence is a constant risk and a general one. Against 
a risk there should be general and constant protection 
manufacturer is best situated to aiford such protec-
(Concurring opinion, EscoZa v. Ooca Oola Boftling 
'Cal.2d 453, 462 [150 P.2d 436].) 
, bottler's duty to the public is to provide a product 
'will safely withstand normal marketing procedures b.-. 
) 
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fore it reaches the consumer. lie must foresee the trl'atment 
to which his bottles will be exposed in normal handling, and 
if he has the responsibility for defects that arise therefrom, 
he will be impelled to selec~ bottles that can withstand strain, 
to pack bottles in such. a 'way as to minimize the chances of 
injury to them, and to select avenues for marketing so that 
they will reach the public in a safe condition. A bottle can 
hardly be considered not defective if it cannot safely with-
stand the treatment it will normally receive in carrying ita 
contents to the consumer . 
•• In the food products cases the courts have resorted to 
various fictions torationaIize the extension of the manu-
facturer's warranty to the consumer: that a warranty runs 
with the chattel; that the cause of action of the dealer ill 
assigned to the consumer; that the consumer is a third party 
beneficiary of the manufacturer's contract with the dealer. 
They have also held the manufacturer liable on a mere fic-
tion of negligence ..•. " (Concurring opinion, EscolG v. COCG 
Co1G Bottli·ng Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 465-466 [150 P.2d 436].) 
Similarly many courts that have not openly made the bottler 
strictly liable have coupled with the doctrine of· res ipsa 
loquitur a fiction that the plaintiit has proved, or at the trial 
will be able to prove, that the condition of the bottle did not 
change from the time it left the bottler until it exploded, with 
the object of fixing liability upon the bottler. (See, e. g., 
PG'Yne v. Bome COCG-ColtJ Bottling Co., 10 Ga.App. 762 [73 
S.E. 1087, 1088]; O,.tego v. Nehi Bottling Works, 199 La. 
599, 605·606 [6 So.2d 677]; StoU6 v. Anheuse,.-Busck, 307 
~o. 5.2(),529 [271 S.W. 497, 39 .A..L.R. 1001]; Benkenilo,.fe,. 
v. GGf'f'eft, (Tex.Civ.App.), 143 S.W.2d 1020, 1023; MtJi:Pher • 
• on v. CGntJda Dry Ginger Ale, ltaC., 129 N.J.L. 365, 366 [29 
A.2d 868]; Mac,." v. CocG-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Mich. 567, 
576-577 [287 N.W. 922] ; cf., EscoltJ v. CoCtJ Cola Bottling Co., 
24 Cal.2d 453,458 [150 P.2d 436]; Boffing v. COCG-CoZG Bot-
tling Co., 87 Cal.App.2d 371,375 [197 P.2d 56].) These deci-
sions tacitly recognize that public policy demands that the 
bottler's responsibility must be measured in terms of the 
normal risks attendant upon . the handling of bottled bever-
ages. "These bottled beverages, containing explosive gases, 
are put upon the market with the intention that they will be 
transported throughout the country and sold to consumers 
for the profit of the manufacturer. Obviously this should be 
at his risk. Public policy requires that the manufacturer 
should assume the risks and hazards of explosion incident to 
J 
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the reasonable and ordinarily careful handling of these goods 
in the usual course of business. . .• It is fair to the manufac· 
t turer, and will afford the consumer of the beverage and those 
handling it in the ordinary course of trade reasonable pro-
;' tection, while the contrary rule leaves them practically without 
\ redress." (Stolle v. Anheuser·Busch, S1tprG, 307 Mo. 520, 529.) 
':;~:In the Escola case the bottler was also the distributor 80 
,'that it was possible to trace the defect directly to him. A 
.'. bottler cannot shift the responsibility to provide a product 
, that will be safe in the hands of the consumer by routing his 
'products through others. "The manufacturer's obligation to 
the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship 
~bctween them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of 
.ii,product has become so complicated as to require one or more 
'pltermediarips." (Concurring opinion, Escola v. COCG ColG 
':Q.o~~Ung Co., 24 C"l1.2d 453, 467-468 [150 P.2d 436].) 
.' 
./ EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion of Mr. Justice 
:Traynor that the instructions to the jury on the doctrine of 
.;Jies ipsa loquitur were prejudicially erroneous, but I do not 
:agree with the rule of strict liability stated. by him in 
,:E,eoltl v. COCG CoZa Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P .2d 
'436Jf and now reiterated. 
;.,' For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
)·a.1'::'~· 
.. ,' ·Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 28, 
IH9. Edmonda, J., voted for a reheariJ1c. 
, <~;,,'; 
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